With an IMF determined to punish past misdemeanours and a government unwilling to embrace meaningful reform, Pakistan’s gas sector is as good as finished and will take industry down with it.
For over three decades, the government actively promoted industrial captive power generation, yet as energy sector mismanagement has resulted in surplus power capacity and escalating tariffs, captive power producers (CPPs) have been made the scapegoat. As the power sector crisis deepened, CPPs were blamed. Under the 2024 Stand-By Arrangement (SBA), the government proposed eliminating CPPs’ gas usage and forcing them onto the national grid to address stranded power capacity. However, this policy—developed without adequate analysis—risks destabilizing both the gas and industrial sectors, with broader economic repercussions. After months of uncertainty regarding gas supply for captive power, the government has opted not to cut off supply but has instead hiked the captive gas tariff to Rs. 3,500/MMBtu plus an additional “grid transition levy” to force industrial energy demand to the grid.
Energy pricing in Pakistan lacks any coherent market-driven logic. Power and gas tariffs are set based on arbitrary calculations that balance the government’s books—even then to the extend possible—rather than reflecting economic realities or ensuring efficient resource allocation. The grid transition levy is the latest in a series of such ill-conceived interventions.
Its stated goal is to align the cost of gas-fired captive generation with the B3 grid tariff, removing any cost advantage for captive power. Yet even the Ordinance through which it has been implemented is unclear about the mechanism with which to achieve this. It first directs authorities to calculate the levy by comparing industrial B3 tariffs with captive power costs, only to contradict itself by mandating automatic rate hikes—5% immediately, increasing to 20% by August 2026.
These conflicting approaches expose the policy’s lack of foresight. If the intent is to eliminate the cost advantage of captive power, then the appropriate mechanism would be a benchmark tariff applied across the board rather than a levy, given that captive consumers can currently avail gas through the utilities at Rs. 3,500/MMBtu or through third-party access at mutually negotiated rates.
Given the variation in effective prices faced by consumers, for the levy to achieve its objective it needs to be tailored to each consumer’s effective gas price. Moreover, for third-party access consumers, economic logic suggests that shippers would simply adjust prices to match the benchmark, capturing the levy as profit rather than achieving the intended policy outcome. This is a textbook case of market distortion, where intervention begets more intervention, ultimately failing to achieve its objective.
Beyond pricing, the assumption that captive consumers can seamlessly transition to the grid is deeply flawed. Grid inefficiencies, infrastructure limitations, and supply reliability remain major concerns. Captive plants operate at different efficiencies based on gas quality and operational conditions, yet the levy applies a blanket cost increase.
The most efficient plants will be penalized, while inefficient operations on the national grid are effectively rewarded.
While the Power Division has directed DISCOs and K-Electric to sign service level agreements (SLAs) with industrial consumers that include penalties for non-compliance, the very need for such agreements raises fundamental concerns. Shouldn’t the national grid inherently provide reliable, high-quality power to all consumers without requiring formal assurances? The fact that DISCOs are now pledging improved supply through SLAs is, in itself, an admission that the existing grid power supply is inadequate for industrial consumers.
Moreover, the SLA clause mandating consumers to source at least 70% of their energy consumption from the grid is highly problematic. Globally, industrial consumers integrate multiple energy sources—including solar, wind, furnace oil, coal, and gas-fired captive power generation—to optimize costs and ensure energy security. There is no regulatory restriction in Pakistan preventing such integration, and this requirement contradicts international best practices. It also severely impacts export-oriented industries, which are increasingly under pressure to meet sustainability commitments and transition towards carbon neutrality. While Pakistan benefits from significant hydropower capacity, the overall carbon footprint of grid electricity remains high due to the intermittency of renewables and continued reliance on thermal generation. Restricting industrial consumers’ ability to diversify energy sources not only undermines their environmental objectives but also weakens their global competitiveness.
Additionally, the cost implications of this requirement are severe. Forcing consumers to rely predominantly on an expensive grid deprives them of the opportunity to optimize costs through alternative, more affordable energy sources. Moreover, fines imposed on DISCOs for SLA violations offer little incentive for genuine compliance, as the financial burden inevitably circles back to consumers—further exacerbating already prohibitive power tariffs.
Adding to the absurdity is the claim that the levy’s revenue will be used to lower power tariffs. Even at Rs. 3,500/MMBtu, captive power generation is already more expensive than the January 2024 B3 grid tariff of ~13 cents/kWh even for the most efficient generators:
Gas consumption has plummeted, as reflected in declining Sui line pack reports, but whether grid consumption increases correspondingly increase remains to be seen. Alternative fuel sources such as furnace oil or coal-fired captive power remain cheaper than grid electricity, further undermining the policy’s effectiveness and making any significant revenue generation from the levy highly questionable.
Rather than introducing arbitrary levies and counterproductive administrative controls, the government should embrace a market-based approach. Textile industries, for instance, have consistently stated their willingness to pay full RLNG rates for self-generation. Yet, instead of allowing industries to procure gas at international prices, the government supplies the same to other consumers at highly subsidized rates, contributing to a Rs. 3 trillion gas circular debt. Pricing out the highest-paying consumers will only lead to exacerbation of the circular debt, billions in lost exports and millions of job losses.
The core issue is that true market reforms would expose the fragile economic equilibrium the government has built through administrative and price controls, and cross-subsidies—not just in energy, but across taxation and industrial policy as well.
Consider the Export Facilitation Scheme, which is actively discouraging domestic value addition in exports while promoting imports. Since July 2024, imported raw materials have been duty- and sales-tax-exempt under EFS, while locally produced inputs are subject to an 18% sales tax. If an exporter purchases local supplies, they must first pay 18% sales tax, then wait six to ten months to file for a refund, only to receive a partial reimbursement of about 70% after a delay of over 6 months, while the remaining 30% remains indefinitely stuck in a broken manual processing system that has seen no progress for years.
Despite universal acknowledgment of the distortionary impact of this policy, the government has refused to correct it. The result has been catastrophic: over 100 spinning units—representing 40% of Pakistan’s production capacity—have already shut down, with the remainder teetering on the brink of insolvency. If unaddressed, this crisis will inevitably spread further downstream to weaving, processing, and garment manufacturing, if energy prices don’t kill them first.
The government must decide whether it genuinely supports economic reform or if it intends to persist with the status quo. If it is serious about reform, it must embrace a market-driven approach—starting with the energy sector.
The grid transition levy must be abandoned, and the gas market must be fully opened, allowing industries to procure gas through third-party access or import their own LNG, free from government-imposed price distortions. The role of the Sui companies in upstream gas allocation should be phased out, restricting them to the gas transportation business only while allowing private-sector players to take over supply.
Beyond gas sector reform, Pakistan must also move towards liberalization of the power sector by operationalizing the Competitive Trading Bilateral Contract Market (CTBCM) that would allow industries to procure competitively priced electricity through B2B contracts. However, for CTBCM to succeed, it must have a rational and transparent wheeling charge of 1 to 1.5 cents/kWh, excluding cross subsidies and stranded costs of the grid, to ensure that industrial consumers are not burdened with extraneous costs unrelated to their actual consumption. A well-functioning power market will improve efficiency, encourage competition, and provide industries with reliable and cost-effective electricity, removing one of the biggest constraints to economic growth.
This would also enable industries access to clean and green electricity that is an increasing necessity for maintaining global competitiveness under upcoming international trade regulations, such as the EU’s Carbon Border Adjustment Mechanism (C-BAM) and existing net zero commitments that require exporters to demonstrate low carbon emissions during production.
If the government is serious about industrial growth, opening up of energy markets is the only way forward. Pakistan’s economy cannot afford half-measures. The continued reliance on flawed interventions will only deepen the crisis. The choice is clear: let the market decide.
